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Our book on Eurozone Crisis has been reviewed and commented by four
distinguished experts in the field, profs Joerges and Ruffert as well as Drs
Georgosouli and Jaros. The reviews show considerable variation in style and focus,
but they all are based on a careful reading of our book and contain thoughtful
comments. For this we want to express our gratitude. We comment first on some
common themes of the reviews and then move on to a few more specific questions.
Our conceptualization of the two layers of the European Economic constitution, the
microeconomic and macroeconomic one, seems to have been well received and
considered helpful for analyzing the crisis. This encourages us to further elaborate
on this order. We also perceived an understanding of the way we have tried to
combine legal and economic analysis. We were also pleased by the “majority view”
that our argumentation was balanced, economically and politically sound, and
independent of mainstream official truth or a particular political position. This was
a result of our continuous questioning of each other’s arguments. Although we
share the same surname we share neither a common educational or professional
background, nor exactly the same political values. If some of our positions are
seen to reflect our underlying ‘political conviction’, this might be due to unfortunate
wordings.
Dr. Georgosouli raises two additional issues: criticism and suggestions by the IMF,
and financial resilience as an emerging theme in macro-prudential regulation. Both
are important aspects and their inclusion could have broadened the discussion. It
was our deliberate choice not to go deeper into the economics of crisis management
for two reasons: it would have lengthened the book considerably and changed its
focus, but even more importantly it would have increased its speculative element.
The economics of the crisis resolution were mainly analysed from the perspective of
the background assumptions of the Maastricht economic constitution. The financial
resilience discussion is interesting and problematizes further the key concept
of stability. Indeed, both ‘past normality’ and ‘stability’ are far more problematic
concepts than they first appear. They could be seen as countering necessary
change and functioning of the market economy, and, consequently, hampering
sustainable growth and prosperity. Dr. Georgosouli is also quite right to point out
that our discussion of a  possible euro exit is by far too narrow. We still felt it was
necessary to mention the basic idea that if euro membership stands (even in the
longer term) in a fundamental contradiction with prospects of economic prosperity
of a Member State, an exit option cannot be excluded, particularly if membership
conditions have substantially changed.
Dr. Jaros correctly points to the link between the ‘economist’ view of macroeconomic
constitution and the social constitution. Europeanized social policy could have
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served objectives of the economic constitution and facilitated approaching an
optimal currency area, by introducing cyclical fiscal transfers, such as unemployment
insurance, at the euro area level. In other words, eligibility to some social insurance
could have been based on EU rather than national citizenship. Somewhat
paradoxically, such ‘social policy’ approach has now been introduced in the context
of the banking union. Both deposit insurance and bank resolution have been
subjected to European criteria and transfers, and will be financed by euro-wide taxes
on consumers (indirectly through banks). Dr. Janos is also more optimistic than
we about the democratic legitimacy potential of intergovernmentalism. If our two
conditions, which she refers to, are met we do not disagree. Our pessimistic view is
due to the experiences of the crisis
Prof. Joerges elaborates further on the present relationship between the
macroeconomic constitution and economic and political reality. He adds valuable
insights to our necessarily limited examination of the important rulings of the German
Constitutional Court which must be seen as interventions in not only the German
but also the European constitutional discourse. The topics Joerges distils from the
rulings obviously relate to fundamental questions of democracy and legitimacy in
the EU. Joerges points out that for Karlsruhe, constitutionalising economic policy
and substituting discretionary policies by legal rules was a necessary condition for
German participation in EMU. Transfer of political competences would have been
in breach of Germany’s democratic statehood. However, Joerges seems to think
that the substitution of politics by law in the EMU has been overestimated and that
what in fact happened could even amount to a deliberate and open-ended transfer
of competences from the democratic process to independent experts. If Joerges
infers from our book that we supported this process because of democratic failures
at the Member State level, we would like to deny such a reading. On the issue of
second-order telos of the non-bail-out clause, namely, financial stability of the euro
area as a whole, Joerges correctly notices some hesitation in our position: this was
due to our attempt to pay heed to all the relevant viewpoints. We also wanted to take
the CJEU Pringle case seriously and tried to find a coherent legal and economic
logic in it, even if we did not require full rationality of its uncertain effort to combine
legal argumentation and macroeconomic theory. But to conclude that we have
explicitly accepted resort to discretionary managerialism, unfettered constitutional or
democratic control, is a misinterpretation of our views.
Prof. Ruffert comments are slightly more critical than other reviewers’. He is not
convinced of the theoretical framework we briefly presented in the first chapter.
This framework draws on Kaarlo Tuori’s previous legal theoretical works and will be
set out in more detail in his forthcoming book on European constitutionalism. We
hope that the book will dispel Rufferts doubts. With regard to the formal mistakes
Ruffert has discovered in his careful reading of our book, we would like to comment
briefly on the ‘myth’ of the influence of the Bundesbank model. We still stick to our
assessment that the Bundesbank’s independence was different from the ECB’s.
It was not constitutionally anchored but first and foremost guaranteed by the
Bundesbank’s credibility among German decision-makers and citizenry at large.
Furthermore, it was not isolated from public criticism or economic policy debates.
Secondly, it is clear – and we do state this in our book – that Sweden does not have
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a formal right to opt out from the EMU.  A decade or so ago, we would perhaps also
have agreed that Sweden violated its legal obligation by refusing to join. However,
the point is that the acceptance of Sweden’s de facto opting out has most likely
contributed to changing euro membership from a legal obligation to an economic
option.
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